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WHO SHOULD TALK?  WHAT COUNTS  
AS EMPLOYEE VOICE AND WHO  
STANDS TO GAIN 
ADITI BAGCHI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The boundaries between labor law and corporate law have long limited the 
perceived remedies to improve both employee well-being and corporate 
performance.  Professor Dau-Schmidt’s paper looks beyond these barriers and 
proposes a number of reforms he believes will simultaneously benefit 
American workers, in their capacity as employees, and the American 
economy as a whole. 
His reforms are motivated by “the under-representation of employee voice 
in the American economy,” which he describes as the underlying cause of 
present deficiencies.1  He envisions that promoting union representation will 
promote an existing, but underused, avenue for employee voice.2  He also 
proposes requiring employee representation on boards of directors.3 
Employee voice is an ambiguous concept.  Professor Dau-Schmidt uses it 
primarily in reference to what I will call “hard voice” as opposed to “soft 
voice.”  That is, he uses voice not to encompass all avenues of expression and 
communication in the workplace, but rather those forms in which the speaker 
may back up the persuasive force of her views with some measure of power.  
I believe Professor Dau-Schmidt overstates the value of even these 
supposedly more forceful variants of employee voice.  In particular, while 
barriers between labor law and corporate law have artificially restricted our 
vision regarding the means available to promote either employee well-being 
or corporate performance, those two ends are genuinely competitive in many 
contexts.  Serving both purposes simultaneously is politically appealing, but 
usually implausible.  Employee voice is not a panacea with which one can 
reconcile genuine conflicts of interest.  In fact, it is not clear whether the 
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1. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for 
Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 767 (2011). 
2. Id. at 828–31. 
3. Id. at 824-25. 
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reforms Professor Dau-Schmidt envisions will achieve substantial gains, even 
if workers’ interests were conceived separately from those of other corporate 
stakeholders. 
However, there is one type of voice whose value Professor Dau-Schmidt 
may actually understate—the right to information. Rights to information, 
which sometimes accompany rights of consultation and notice, are only 
abstractly recognizable as a form of “voice.”  Despite facing formidable 
obstacles to implementation in most contexts, this form of voice is probably 
more attainable than other forms of voice that Professor Dau-Schmidt 
advocates. It may also improve employee well-being more than additional and 
seemingly more arduous requirements that might be imposed on corporations. 
Employee voice is valued for many reasons.  Those reasons which have 
little to do with welfare improvements—for workers or anyone else—are less 
sensitive to the concerns raised here.  For many people, voice is intrinsically 
valuable.  We spend a large number of our waking hours at work, and the 
absence of opportunities for self-expression and engagement during that time 
is depressing, if not dehumanizing.  Many of the arguments for participation 
in institutional design and policy-making in the political sphere carry over to 
the workplace as well.4 
In light of these benefits of voice, the promotion of employee voice is a 
worthwhile and welcome endeavor.  Few have Professor Dau-Schmidt’s 
breadth and depth of understanding of the context in which these reforms 
would take place.  He has written about numerous dimensions of labor and 
corporate law, and he provides his insights regarding how labor markets and 
corporate structures function to bear on the question of institutional design. 
But Professor Dau-Schmidt does not rely on non-instrumental grounds to 
justify his project.  Instead, his arguments are rooted in the positive 
consequences he anticipates will flow from enhancing employee voice.5  Most 
advocates of similar policies emphasize the benefits that workers can expect 
to accrue, but Professor Dau-Schmidt makes a more ambitious case. Professor 
Dau-Schmidt posits that corporations themselves, conceived as complex 
 
4. Consider classic arguments regarding the importance of participation in public life, and in 
politics in particular, to human flourishing.  See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 3 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., 
Forgotten Books 2007) (1885); see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-
Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329, 
340 (1994) (describing reliance on Aristotle by Republic legal theorists and proponents of 
deliberative democracy).  For a contemporary discussion of the importance of public participation in 
public administration, see generally Michael P. Smith, Alienation and Bureaucracy: The Role of 
Participatory Administration, 31 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 658 (1971).  For one recent analysis of the 
politics-union analogy, see Thomas Tso, The “Political Marketplace” Metaphor from a Labor 
Perspective, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 831, 878–79 (2009). 
5. Id. at 800–09. 
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amalgamations of interests, also stand to benefit from enhanced employee 
voice.6  I suggest that we be skeptical about the net welfare benefits of 
employee voice to either corporations or employees.  As a general matter, we 
should think less about what employees have to say and more about what they 
need to hear. 
II.  VOICE AS A POWER 
The notion of employee voice is ambiguous.  Here, I will use it to describe 
three methods by which employees might exercise some control over the 
ways they are affected by the policies and fortunes of their employers.  First, 
“hard” voice refers to the ability to exercise power and shape the direction of 
the firm and its treatment of employees in particular.  Second, “soft” voice 
refers to the ability to engage in dialogue with or provide feedback to the 
relevant decision-makers.  Finally, access to information, while not an 
obvious form of employee voice, is an alternative means for employees to 
control how their employment disrupts or advances their lives and life 
projects—but not the acts and policies of corporations. 
In the first usage, employee voice means “say,” as in power.  This use of 
the term voice is a bit euphemistic because the notion of power arguably 
better characterizes what people seek with this type of “voice.”  The 
conflation of voice with power envisions a particular process of corporate 
decision-making.  This approach pretends that decisions are the product of 
reasoned deliberations among parties, each of whose view is taken into 
account to the extent that it illuminates problems to be solved.  In such a 
model of deliberation, the gap between voice and power shrinks because the 
exercise of voice, or the opportunity to communicate ideas to the deliberating 
body, naturally translates into influence over the outcomes of those 
deliberations.  In this view, voice implies a seat at the table, and were the 
parties at the corporate table truly engaged in reasoned deliberation, it would 
be enough to assure influence and a modicum of control. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt’s own portrait of the internal processes of 
corporations suggests a trough more than a table.  But part of his aim is to 
rearrange processes to facilitate more rational decision-making.  Bringing 
labor to the table is a large part of that project. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt proposes two methods for increasing employee 
voice in this sense: (1) increasing both access to unions and access by unions, 
and (2) giving workers direct representation on corporate boards of directors.7  
His arguments tend to focus on the benefits these changes would bring to 
 
6. Id.   
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corporations.8  I will address these proposed reforms’ likelihood for success in 
light of their impact on both workers and firms “as a whole,” because such 
proposed reforms are usually motivated by worker interests in particular. 
A.   Promoting Unionization to Enhance Worker Voice 
Professor Dau-Schmidt argues that active union engagement will help 
bring productivity-enhancing ideas to the right decision-making tables within 
companies.9  Presently, workers may make proposals to their immediate 
supervisors, but the latter often have little incentive to relay suggestions to 
someone within the company capable of acting on the proposals.10  
Alternatively, and just as likely, the supervisors themselves lack the power to 
transmit ideas to an appropriate person within the prevailing corporate 
hierarchy, let alone the ability to directly effectuate a recommendation.  The 
result is that workers have no reason to consider how their operations could be 
improved, nor any reason to articulate and give voice to their formed ideas.  
By contrast, unions would have incentive to listen to their members’ ideas 
because acting as a source of efficiency-enhancing ideas would elevate their 
status as bargaining partners.  Any marginal improvement in productivity 
would also give unions more leverage to push their own demands on behalf of 
workers.  Thus, unions are relatively well-placed for soliciting, taking 
seriously, processing, and then advocating productivity-enhancing ideas 
generated by their membership.11 
Unions monitor the workplace—from shopfloor operations to accounting 
practices, and from worker attitudes to boardroom dynamics.  They provide 
this oversight to promote and monitor the interests of their members, which is 
their primary function.12  In doing so, they are also able to serve as eyes and 
ears for the underlying interests of the corporation.13  Professor Dau-Schmidt 
 
8. Id. at 769-771. 
9. Id. at 805. 
10. See Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, Employee Involvement and the Middle Manager: Evidence 
from a Survey of Organizations, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 67, 81 (1998). 
11. See William N. Cooke, Employee Participation Programs, Group-Based Incentives, and 
Company Performance: A Union-Nonunion Comparison, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 594, 597–98 
(1994) (noting employee participation may result in greater productivity gains in unionized 
workplaces).  
12. See Armen A. Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory 
of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 235, 243–44 (1982); 
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 319, 357–58 (2005); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315–16 (1978); David Weil, Enforcing 
OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 21 (1991); Diane E. Lewis, Unions Seeking 
Leverage as Shareholders, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1996, at 71, 75. 
13. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
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emphasizes that those interests may be diverted by management, who often 
prove to be imperfect agents.  Management ostensibly oversees workers on 
behalf of shareholders, but workers may provide valuable oversight of 
management through unions. 
There are a number of potential problems with this form of voice.  The 
most immediate obstacle is that unions are currently a minor presence in the 
private labor market.14  But this objection is somewhat defeatist because 
Professor Dau-Schmidt’s point is precisely that the benefits unions generate 
should motivate us to lower obstacles to union certification and strengthen 
their hand once on the scene. 
But there are other problems, especially with Professor Dau-Schmidt’s 
choice to defend these proposals on the grounds that they will enhance 
corporate performance.  Whether unions increase worker productivity and 
improve corporate performance are extremely broad questions that cannot be 
adequately treated in this article.  But these are empirical questions, and while 
there are almost certainly some corporate settings in which unions can play a 
positive role—independent of their effect on worker compensation and quality 
of work life—there are surely others where the gains that unions achieve for 
their members come at the expense of company competitiveness.  The 
looming task is to identify the conditions under which union interests better 
align with shareholder interests.  Professor Dau-Schmidt has yet to detail 
those conditions.  Are there particular kinds of work environments in which 
unions are best suited to play a public-interest role?  Are there work 
arrangements in which productivity is enhanced by worker input as mediated 
by unions?  When are other means of communication between workers and 
management ineffective, such that unions contribute marginally more?  
Inconsistent studies regarding the effect of unions on worker productivity 
suggest that the truth of the matter lies in the details.15  While there may be 
 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1021–24 (1998); Randall S. Thomas 
& Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1021, 1036 (1999). 
14. Last year labor unions represented only 7.2% of the private sector workforce.  Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members - 2009 (Jan. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01222010.pdf. 
15. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 7–22 
(1984); John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has 
the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 84 (1989); Carliss Y. Baldwin, Productivity and Labor 
Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts, 56 J. BUS., 155, 159 (1983); Kim 
B. Clark, Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, Growth, and Productivity, 74 
AM. ECON. REV. 893, 915 (1984); Christos Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche, What Do Unions Do to 
Productivity? A Meta-Analysis, 42 INDUS. REL. 650, 670–71 (2003); Sheldon Friedman & Christian 
Weller, One More Time: Labor Market Flexibility, Aggregate Demand, and Comparative 
Employment Growth in the U.S. and Europe, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 307, 314 (1998); Victor 
R. Fuchs et al., Economists’ Views About Parameters, Values, and Policies: Survey Results in Labor 
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settings where unions play the role that Professor Dau-Schmidt suggests, it 
seems likely that unions can play that role only when all the stars are aligned. 
Not all workplaces are equally hospitable to unions as corporate players.  
Unions may consistently achieve benefits for workers in their compensation 
and advance their interests relative to other corporate stakeholders, but that 
very fact creates a prima facie case for their negative effect on corporate 
competitiveness.  Alleged gains to corporate performance stem from 
improvements in worker motivation and tenure on the one hand, and 
improved production design on the other.  That unions would enhance worker 
morale and perhaps worker tenure is logical, but in many cases worker 
productivity is driven by production design, not the characteristics of workers.  
Claims about how workers can enhance productive processes are more 
tenuous.  The plausibility of these claims—and any empirical study 
supporting them—will turn on the precise causal mechanisms by which they 
will improve productivity and the frequency with which those mechanisms 
can be expected to play out in different work contexts.  Both have yet to be 
identified with specificity. 
Even if unions do prove to be an effective means to improve corporate 
performance in various respects, unions almost certainly do so at some cost.  
And it is not realistic to think that those costs will only be borne by rich but 
incompetent managers, at whose expense unions will institute needed 
corporate reforms. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt is surely right to ask policymakers to learn a 
lesson from recent experience and to “help” shareholders withdraw from their 
asymmetrical love affair with grossly overcompensated management.  
Managers are sometimes awarded fantastic compensation packages with little 
or no ties to their job performance and at times undertake projects that appear 
better suited to promoting their immediate public stature and short-term 
option values than preserving long-term shareholder value.  Professor Dau-
Schmidt is rightly dissatisfied with the means proposed by most scholars to 
reign in managers. 
Most scholars rely on tools that are specifically targeted to the problem of 
executive compensation.16  Some proposals have an uncomfortable retroactive 
dimension.17  Adopted reforms, which require disinterested parties to 
 
and Public Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 1387, 1392, 1418 (1998); Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions 
Do for Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415, 430–31 (2004). 
16. For an overview of the problem of executive compensation, see Jerry W. Markham, 
Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 278–82 
(2007). 
17. See Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can 
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111, 
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scrutinize compensation in good faith, have failed to curtail rising 
compensation packages, perhaps because such disinterested persons are 
difficult to locate and the model may wrongly assume that astronomical 
compensation is always the product of inside-dealing and bad faith.18  One 
may fear that tax policies intended to curtail executive compensation will be 
circumvented, if not entirely elminated after the next election (indeed, they 
are unlikely since the last election).19  While many proposed reforms are 
commendable, many (but obviously not all) are narrow in their ambition and 
do not seem aimed at reforming the decision-making process that gives rise to 
excessive executive compensation.  Professor Dau-Schmidt is correct to dig 
deeper, and is persuasive that the best way to temper the runaway benefits and 
power of management is to elevate a competing interest within the 
corporation.  He is also persuasive in his argument that labor is well-
motivated and well-positioned to play this oversight role. 
However, highlighting the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
management, and the extent to which corporate law continues to struggle with 
regulating this principal-agent relationship, does not detract from the conflict 
of interest that also exists between shareholders and workers.  As Professor 
Dau-Schmidt admits, alliances within a given corporate community are fluid 
and shifting.  Employees of a corporation may help keep management in 
check, but sometimes employees have common interests with management, 
such as keeping a corporation afloat, that shareholders may not share.  
Shareholders may benefit when workers strengthen the former’s hand against 
management, but workers often find themselves facing a wall formed by an 
alliance of shareholders and managers because shareholders may also lose by 
conceding power to unions.  After all, it is not just managers’ compensation 
that comes out of shareholders’ pockets.  And while shareholders may want to 
monitor and improve the “value-add” of their managers, they also wish to 
increase the marginal productivity of workers in ways that can be inconsistent 
with workers’ interests.  The cheapest and quickest way to increase 
 
112, 125–26 (2010); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration of 
Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135, 1147–51 (2010).  Even contract provisions that 
are ostensibly prospective usually authorize clawback on highly uncertain conditions that the parties 
do not fully or unilaterally control, such that many of the fairness concerns that might plague 
clawbacks remain.  See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective 
Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 368, 372–73, 380–84 (2009). 
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring independent compensation committees in 
exchange-traded firms); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling 
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 75–78 (1992) (critiquing committee solution). 
19. For some tax proposals that address excess compensation, see Meredith R. Conway, Money 
for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 383, 391–419 (2008). 
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productivity is to require workers to work longer hours without increasing 
compensation.  This has indeed been the favored strategy of American 
corporations.20  Unfortunately, this strategy has become our national 
comparative advantage in certain sectors.  None of this bodes well for an 
initiative to persuade shareholders that it is ultimately in their best interest to 
allocate a larger share of power within the corporation to worker 
representatives. 
One might attempt to locate an argument that strengthening the hand of 
unions will improve corporate performance in a larger effort to shift the 
source of the United States’ comparative advantage in global markets.  But 
that argument requires a longer discussion in directions that Professor Dau-
Schmidt does not pursue in his paper.  Likely, Professor Dau-Schmidt has a 
more fundamental reason for his confidence that his proposed reforms will 
benefit the American Company: his conception of corporate interests. 
If we were to reconceive the American corporation as an animal apart 
from the familiar model trumpeted by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, i.e., 
privileging interests other than those of its shareholders,21 then perhaps the 
direction in which Professor Dau-Schmidt’s reforms would lead firms is 
indeed the best trajectory for corporations.  But while corporate law literature 
debates the preeminence of the Berle-Means model,22 corporate and securities 
law tends to consistently assess the conduct of corporate agents, including 
management, by reference to shareholder interests.23 
One of the chief justifications for this focus on shareholders’ interests is 
the sheer simplicity of identifying a single group whose interests are to be 
managed.  In reality, the interests of shareholders as a group are quite varied, 
 
20. See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR 
RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 59 (2003); LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE 
OF WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009, at 128 tbl.3.2, 365 (2009). 
21. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist 
Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008).  See generally 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER M. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 1–18 (photo reprint 1982) (1932). 
22. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizen United, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 169–70 (2010); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle 
and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 179–80, 185 
(2005).  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 671 (1995); William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s 
Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal 
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1681–82 (1988); Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The 
Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 579 (2004).  
23. SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969) (referring to “paramount federal interest 
in protecting shareholders”); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (describing a breach of the duty of loyalty as a failure to act in the good faith pursuit of the 
shareholders’ interests). 
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consisting of shareholders with long-term and short-term interests, and with 
varying degrees of exposure, diversification, and risk tolerance.24  But 
pointing to the existing diversity of interests within the corporation and 
expanding it for the sake of completeness creates an ad hoc list of interests.  
And equating all of those interests with the new “corporate interest” is a risky 
enterprise because it renders still more complex and unpredictable any effort 
to assess the internal or external governance of corporations.  Recognizing 
these varied interests as co-equal also obscures real challenges in institutional 
design.  Allowing space for competitive markets to function while 
empowering workers to exact their fair share of its fruits has been a 
worldwide struggle for centuries, and it cannot be resolved by wishing the 
divergence of interest away. If we conceive corporate interests more 
inclusively, we will require another mechanism to sort them that allows us to 
prioritize some interests in certain contexts while allowing others to prevail at 
other decision points.  The underlying conflict of interest is real.  Professor 
Dau-Schmidt rightly emphasizes that it is not the case that managers and 
shareholders are naturally aligned against workers.  Sometimes shareholders 
and workers have interests in common that oppose managers’ interests.  But 
there are also instances where managers and workers have common interests 
against shareholders.  There are also circumstances when each of these 
groups’ interests align with taxpayers or consumers and not with each other.  
We should not reveal the artificiality of any one arrangement of interests only 
to reify another.  Interests are fluid and there is no permanent, natural alliance 
of workers with any one group of corporate stakeholders. 
The challenge is to understand the options in terms of institutional design: 
the outcomes for various groups associated with each possible arrangement.  
More challenging still will be the normative choices we must make between 
these constellations of outcomes.  Professor Dau-Schmidt risks glossing over 
the reality of these challenges by sometimes writing as though realigning the 
corporation to accommodate a wider set of interests—and demoting the 
interests of spoiled managers in particular—is adequate to resolve real 
tensions and troubles. 
Increasing workers’ opportunities to voice ideas and concerns by 
strengthening unions would also make sense if it could at least be expected to 
benefit workers themselves.  But while unions may achieve a number of gains 
for workers by strengthening their position vis-à-vis employers, worker 
benefits that specifically result from an opportunity to participate in corporate 
decision-making largely depend on whether their contributions enhance 
 
24. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561, 577 (2006); Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
1355, 1372–80 (2010). 
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corporate performance in the first instance.  As discussed above, this 
assumption seems dubious. 
Unions are a valuable tool inasmuch as they enable workers to exact 
concessions from employers, or as discussed below, inasmuch as they 
empower workers to extract information from firms.  But these benefits of 
unions are not best described as instances of employee voice.  Voice may be 
conceived as a mechanism of power under certain conditions of corporate 
decision-making. Unions neither participate in truly deliberative processes 
(because they do not exist) nor help bring such processes into existence; they 
win benefits for workers through the exercise of raw power.  Their role is not 
aptly characterized as facilitating employee voice.  Unions are more likely to 
be good for workers than other corporate stakeholders, and even the gains 
they achieve should not be understood as benefits of employee voice. 
B.  Worker Representation on Corporate Boards 
Professor Dau-Schmidt argues that corporate performance can also be 
achieved in part through employee representation on boards of directors.  
Such representation would give workers direct say; they could act as a 
counterpoint to the undue influence of management, and; they would offer a 
long-term perspective that would ultimately benefit not only employees but 
also shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The proposal for employee representation on corporate boards is 
reminiscent of German co-determination, as Professor Dau-Schmidt himself 
observes.25  German co-determination involves this type of worker 
consultation and worker participation in plant-level decision-making through 
works councils.26  Unlike participation on supervisory boards, works council 
legislation was met with initial resistance from unions, who feared that they 
would function as alternatives to unions.27  Of course, both forms of co-
determination—supervisory board participation and works councils—also met 
resistance from corporations, who feared that the interests of property-
owners—banks, shareholders and other owners of corporations—would be 
compromised. 
Both forms of co-determination are now well regarded as successes and 
have expanded beyond initial requirements.28  Worker representation on 
 
25. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [Participation Act], May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153 (F.R.G.). 
26. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Labor Management Relations Act], Jan. 15, 1972, BGBl. I at 13 
(F.R.G.). 
27. Kathleen A. Thelen, UNION OF PARTS: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTWAR GERMANY 64 (1991). 
28. See Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Consequences of 
Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 305, 325–28 (2008). 
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supervisory boards is the less glorified of the two dimensions of co–
determination, given that shareholders retain the deciding vote and important 
decisions are perceived to be made in subcommittees, on which employees 
might not be represented.  But companies have managed to succeed in 
competitive markets and have arguably adapted to transform perceived 
handicapping decision-process requirements into a comparative advantage.29  
Works councils are considered essential, and companies heavily rely upon 
them to negotiate the specific needs of particular locations and plants as they 
may deviate from the standardized plans and obligations negotiated at the 
corporate or industry level.30 
But both levels of co–determination, supervisory board participation and 
works councils, have relied heavily on unions as a mediating institution.  Most 
candidates for both boards and councils are sponsored by the industry union.31  
Arguably, election procedures are especially favorable to unions because they 
make it difficult for lesser-known candidates to establish a foothold in general 
elections.  The result is that little disunity among employee interests finds 
expression.  Whether at the collective bargaining stage, in the supervisory 
board, or in works councils, unions are an established presence with the 
institutional clout and wherewithal to navigate corporate politics and fractious 
divisions among employees.  It is doubtful, or at least unknown, whether 
employee “voice” in Germany would operate so efficiently and effectively 
were unions not well-established and accepted players on many fronts within 
corporations. 
Of course, in the vast majority of workplaces in the United States, unions 
are entirely absent.  And when they do exist, they simply do not enjoy the 
same prestige and clout that enables German unions to resolve divisions 
within the groups they represent.  American unions have been restricted to a 
small role for various reasons, including protecting their integrity (restrictions 
on cooperation with management stem from such concerns) and their 
legitimacy (restrictions on the size of bargaining units, the scope of their 
powers, and the procedures to which they are subject in order to maintain 
certification also stem from such concerns).  The consequence is that 
American unions are not equipped to play the role that German unions play in 
German co–determination, and we cannot take the German experience as 
grounds for optimism about similar proposed forms of direct employee 
representation in the United States. 
 
29. Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Labor Politics in Developed Democracies, in VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 71, 76, 92 (Peter 
A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
30. Wolfgang Streeck, Industrial Relations in West Germany: Agenda for Change, in 
Forschungsschwerpunkt Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung (IIMV) 4–5 (1987). 
31. Thelen, supra note 33, at 78–80. 
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Employee representation on corporate boards presents many questions.  If 
employees were granted representation on corporate boards, how would 
employees select those representatives?  Would all employees have a single 
representative?  Would that representative be elected by all employees or 
some subgroup, for example, those employees over whom the National Labor 
Relations Board exercises jurisdiction, or employees covered by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act?  If legitimacy concerns have plagued unions, even 
while operating under the requirement of homogenous bargaining units, how 
will a single representative representing a diverse spectrum of employees be 
perceived as legitimate by her own constituency, let alone her colleagues on a 
board?  Will not there be worries that she will consistently privilege some 
groups of employees over the interests of others?  Will corporations be 
permitted to appoint the employee representative themselves, simply ascribing 
to that person certain fiduciary obligations, in a manner comparable to the role 
of trustees overseeing employee stock option plans?  The more accountable an 
employee representative, the more hobbled she will be by paralyzing divisions 
among employees. The more unleashed she is to rise above those factions, the 
less legitimacy she will be perceived to possess, and the less effective an 
advocate she will be. 
If unions were a stronger presence in the American workplace, they would 
lend some of their prestige and credibility to the new institution of worker 
representation on corporate boards. As in Germany, they could harness 
existing practices for mediating conflicts of interests among their membership 
and still apply substantial pressure on behalf of their positions on questions of 
corporate policy and direction.  But this is not the institutional environment 
we presently face.  As a result, more needs to be said regarding how a system 
of direct employee representation on boards would credibly and effectively 
function. 
III. “SOFT” EMPLOYEE VOICE: THE VALUE AND LIMITS OF EXPRESSION AS A 
TOOL OF REFORM 
Professor Dau-Schmidt also uses the notion of employee voice to describe 
opportunities for employees to convey their ideas and opinions.  In contrast to 
how the notion of employee voice was employed in the previous section, this 
kind of employee voice creates opportunities for expression.  “Soft” employee 
voice does not necessarily involve the exercise of any power or control by 
employees or their representatives.  In principle, a box where employees can 
drop their comments and suggestions is an example of such a mechanism for 
employee voice.  In practice, whether such a mechanism is at all effective will 
depend on the incentives that lower-level and upper-level management have 
to take those suggestions seriously, and there is a fine line between incentives 
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for management and lines of power enjoyed by employees. 
Where there is truly nothing but bare opportunity, unbacked by any 
mechanism for influence or control, these types of employee voice are 
unlikely to encounter a great deal of opposition, except where procedures 
incorporate notice periods and other delays.  But it also seems unlikely that 
reforms intended to encourage these forms of voice will bring about any 
important changes in methods of corporate governance, or even micro-level 
changes in how a particular plant or factory operates.  Bare voice holds the 
promise of important efficiency gains only where improvements are easy and 
uncontroversial; such low-hanging fruit is likely to have been picked already. 
It is possible that in individual cases, workplaces have failed to make 
improvements that are costless merely because they have not empowered 
workers to contribute ideas that would be accepted and implemented.  But 
even managers that stand to gain from short-term profits, which come at the 
expense of long-term performance, also stand to gain from costless 
improvements that increase efficiency of the firm.  Little would seem to be 
gained from legislative or administrative incentives (which are themselves not 
costless) that motivate the firm to adopt those rare measures which everyone 
is already motivated to support but which have been simply overlooked. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt also appears to join those who are skeptical of the 
present obstacles to employee participation in committees and other 
collaborative exercises with higher-level employees of a firm.  For historical 
reasons, American labor law is wary of such venues for employee voice and 
views them as “company unions” intended to supplant or ward off “real” 
unions.32 
Specific examples of apparently benign attempts to establish lines of 
communication between employees and management, which were deemed 
violative of the NLRA, are the best fuel for relaxing rules on company 
domination.  Critics of the existing rules also point out that most workforces 
are not and will not be unionized in any case, such that it is counterproductive 
to limit the forms of cooperation available to all employees just in case some 
small fraction of employees join an independent union instead.33 
 
32. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere 
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support 
to it . . . .”  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006); see also Michael C. Harper, 
The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
2322, 2324 n.7, 2326–27 (1998). 
33. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The 
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (1994); 
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized 
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 62–63 (1993); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise 
and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What’s Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 
1152–62 (2007). 
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I do not argue here against such proposals, but only point out that the 
adversarial character of labor relations in the United States is not the product 
of the rules on company domination.34  Thus, critics of the rules on company 
domination that would prefer a more collaborative corporate culture have a 
larger task at hand than revising a single provision of the NLRA.  Adversarial 
culture has multiple sources and manifestations.  In our present corporate 
culture, even committees and workgroups that are genuinely designed to elicit 
employee voice are likely tainted by employees’ rational fear of their 
employers’  power.  The result may be that these committees are rarely an 
effective means for employees to express views and ideas that are not in the 
interests of employers.  Employee committees might be a relatively 
inexpensive mechanism to solicit certain information that will benefit 
corporate performance, but not a means by which employees can expect to 
advance their own interests within the corporate organization.  All of this may 
be true, even in the absence of active employer domination, and even where 
employers sincerely aspire to learn about workers’ preferences in hopes of 
offering competitive compensation and workplace experiences.  If the benefits 
of employee committees are ultimately limited, they may not outweigh the 
risk that in a minority of cases, those committees will be used to shut down 
(or will have the inadvertent effect of making less probable) more productive 
avenues for employee “voice.”  Whatever the ideal corporate culture, within 
the ambit of what is possible in the American context, we may come to see 
restrictions on certain forms of collaboration as an attainable second-best. 
 
34. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW (2001) (describing an adversarial legal culture that pervades subject matter areas, including 
areas of corporate governance that are unrelated to the National Labor Relations Act and its 
immediate concerns). 
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IV.  EMPLOYEES AND INFORMATION 
Still another meaning of employee voice is the least natural and the least 
utilized, but perhaps the most important.  In this last form, voice is not about 
speaking to anyone.  It is not directed at the employer, who may or may not be 
listening, and who may or may not do as one bids.  Instead, this notion of 
voice describes an attempt at agency.  Elevating workers’ sense of agency 
may be achieved not just by empowering them to alter the course of 
corporations, but also by giving them direct control over what really matters 
to them: how the course of corporations affects the course of their own lives.  
Banal information about corporate financial health, corporate strategy, and 
employment practices can inform the decisions that workers make, which can 
in turn improve their experience of employment. 
Where voice takes the form of consultation or notice rights, it is 
sometimes accompanied by rights to information.  This information may 
pertain to company finances, performance, plans, policies, and practices 
related to the workforce, including labor market data assembled by human 
resources staff, hiring and promotion trends, salary and other compensation 
data, and heath care and pension options available to the company.  Rules 
requiring consultation or notice are weak and ineffective in the absence of 
rights to such information, but when a company is required to make this kind 
of information available to employees, “soft” rights of consultation and notice 
may actually be more valuable to employees than the seemingly stronger right 
to participate in decision-making through negotiation or representation on 
boards or councils.  The latter may also be valuable to the extent these rights 
are backed by obligations of disclosure and data sharing. 
To give a sense of the kind of information I am referring to, consider 
employees who are deciding whether to look for employment at another firm.  
These employees will be interested in the general financial health of their 
employer, but also their particular prospects.  If a union is present and is 
entitled to relevant data, it may act as a filter and only provide what is most 
useful to the employee, or perhaps even offer its assessment of the data.  In 
the absence of a union, employees would need to have direct access to the 
data in some digestible form.  For many employees, information about job 
prospects, which is essential to an individual’s ability to plan, is probably 
more important than a small opportunity to influence those prospects on the 
margin.  Cynthia Estlund has argued that similar information should be made 
systematically available across the labor market.35  But Professor Dau-
Schmidt’s view of the employees’ position within the firm is an opportunity to 
 
Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 
(2011). 
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understand how each firm might better inform its existing employees, even in 
the absence of a government agency that centrally collects, processes, and 
distributes this information. 
Whether deciding to accept a job, join a union, leave a job, or work 
harder, employees consistently lack information that they need to make fair 
and efficient decisions for themselves and the labor market.  These decisions 
might improve corporate performance, but they will at least improve 
employees’ positions within firms because employees will be less vulnerable 
to a corporation’s economic fortunes and policy changes, which they 
presently experience as the unpredictable winds of good or ill fortune. 
Even if there are many gains to be realized from requiring companies to 
disclose certain categories of data to employees, there remains the question of 
who will assemble, check and distribute this information, especially in 
nonunionized workplaces.  Firms will have legitimate concerns about the 
confidentiality of such data.  I cannot work out a scheme for data disclosure 
here, but only suggest that this dimension of employee voice may warrant 
more attention that Professor Dau-Schmidt provides. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The long-standing project of promoting employee voice in the workplace 
is motivated by various concerns.  Professor Dau-Schmidt joins the project 
with a particular angle, namely, that employee voice is good not just for 
employees but also for the corporations that employ them.  His contribution 
comes at a unique time, when public policy experts should be looking to 
retool corporate governance to promote a different set of goals than some 
corporate managers appear to have pursued in recent times.  Blame for the 
most recent recession has been aimed more at banks and, to a lesser extent, at 
irresponsible consumers.  Main Street, a favorable reference that is generously 
applied to the American corporate world and sometimes seems to embrace 
retailers and manufacturers, has been perceived as a victim more than in 
previous downturns (e.g. the downturn surrounding Enron or the burst of the 
dot com bubble).  Still, people are probably more receptive to the idea that we 
need fundamental reform in the corporate sector than they would be in better 
times. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt’s contribution is also more ambitious than some 
others who have promoted the idea of employee voice as conducive to worker 
productivity.  But he wears this ambition lightly and does not state it 
expressly.  The latent ambition is to rewrite the concept of the corporation.  
Professor Dau-Schmidt does not ultimately rely only on empirical studies that 
may show some worker productivity gains (but are unlikely to be holistic 
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assessments of the economic consequences of worker voice).  He implicitly 
rejects the idea that the corporation and its interests can be identified solely by 
reference to an elusive set of shareholders and their inconsistent interests.  In 
this respect, Professor Dau-Schmidt does capitalize on present discontentment 
with capital markets as a mechanism to discipline and rationalize product 
markets.  Who are the shareholders?  Who controls their votes?  Who 
determines what their interests are, for purposes of corporate decision-
making?  More than ever, we are skeptical that decisions are really being 
made by, or even for, the typical shareholder.  Instead, shareholder power 
seems at times a mask for the power of intermediating financial institutions 
that seem insufficiently separable from each other or their regulators.  Now it 
seems plausible that other stakeholders in the corporation may be as good or 
better candidates to anchor the direction of corporations.  Workers as a group, 
who after all constitute a majority of the population, seem like a natural group 
whose interests might direct corporations in a manner that would benefit both 
worker and firm. 
There is much appeal about this general strategy, but I use this response to 
signal caution on two dimensions.  First, the isolation of a single interest 
group within a corporate community and its elevation to “principal” status 
within the corporation, to the extent that its interests are equated with those of 
the corporation, was not unmotivated (or, to avoid imputing more 
intentionality than warranted to a complex legal evolution, we might say it 
was “not without benefits”).  Nor was it motivated by a nefarious plot to 
overthrow all other interests present within a given corporate context.  Rather, 
it was a strategy not fully conscious, and not without flaws—to deal with a 
genuine conflict of interest among stakeholders in firms by assigning them 
separate roles, with separate means by which to exercise influence over 
corporate policy. It may be that the role and means assigned to workers in this 
institutional arrangement were inadequate.  The legal shuffle took place not in 
one game of cards, but over the course of many legislative and litigious 
contests.  There may be ways for worker interests to be better represented.  
And a reminder that a firm has no naturally defined interest that is inevitably 
in conflict with those of workers is surely a productive exercise.  But brushing 
aside genuine conflicts, by emphasizing a unity of interest against 
incompetent and greedy managers, is potentially distracting from the 
challenging task of finding a way to change the winners and losers, even 
where some of the new losers are sympathetic and do not inherently deserve 
to lose. 
Secondly, and more practically, the task of finding new ways for 
employees to exercise voice within the firm risks glossing over a more 
fundamental problem facing most American workers: they are not even in a 
position to know what they should want their employers to do on a range of 
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basic matters.  First, the “worker interest” on a given matter requires 
formulation and negotiation among workers, and we lack institutions (given 
the limited presence and restricted potency of unions) capable of mediating 
heterogeneous worker interests and forging a common worker interest that is a 
plausible and potent counterweight to other interests within a corporate 
context.  Second, the “worker interest” is not a function of workers’ 
circumstances and desires but must also reflect facts about the world outside 
themselves.  An institution capable of forging something called the “worker 
interest” must be capable of locating and processing facts about labor markets, 
though the facts are not readily available in great detail for any region or 
market. 
Presently, the worker interest with respect to any specific policy decision 
facing the firm is unformed and undeveloped because workers lack 
information about the firm itself.  How do workers know what they want to be 
paid if they do not know the firm’s position in global markets and what the 
realistic tradeoffs will be?  How do workers know whether they want a firm to 
expand employment if they do not know this information?  These are the 
kinds of decisions in which workers would typically seek to exercise voice 
through negotiation.  And what about matters for which they might play some 
other, collaborative role?  How will workers take a position on whether new 
technologies should be pursued, without information about those technologies 
and their costs, the anticipated actions of competitor firms, or their impact on 
future employment? 
Once we realize that information is critical to the formulation of worker 
interests, which must be formed before voiced, we realize that the very real 
conflict of interest I have described between workers and other stakeholders 
in a corporation exists on this front as well.  The war of (or for) data is another 
manifestation of how legitimate interests can collide.  Just as surely as 
workers have a legitimate interest in accessing data about a firm, its markets, 
and its policies, firm managers have an interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of this data from competitor firms and, in some cases, from 
workers themselves.  I do not offer any solution to these conflicts of interest 
here, but only identify them as real obstacles in the path of meaningful 
reform. 
 
